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Introduction of Parliamentarian: William J. Stevens, Attorney.
Report by the President: Charles Schwartz.
Report by the General Manager: Gilbert Spencer.

Distribution of Earnings by the Treasurer: Frank T. Okita.

Discussion of above reports.

Presentation of Resolutions:

(1) Alan and Lois Dobry: "Resolutions presented at meeting without previous notice"...

(2) Shirley Lens: "Peace and other neighborhood organizations be granted the right to have tables for petitions, etc., in store"...

(3) John Rossen: "An immediate end to American participation in the war in Vietnam and immediate withdrawal and return of all American military personnel"...

(4) Richard Murray: "Negotiate a loan for at least \$10,000 to East Garfield Park Co-operative Assn. for instigation of small grocery store"...

Discussion and vote on above Resolutions.

Movie: "This is a Cooperative."

New business and adjournment.

HYDE PARK IS ARTICULATE

Mr. Speaker, I close with this quotation from President Schwartz' report:

Many of these events reflect the maturity and success of the co-op. * * * Differences of opinion are inevitable in all such efforts, especially in our articulate community.

Hyde Park is an articulate community. Perhaps that is the reason for its greatness and of the success of the Hyde Park Co-op.

FLOOD INSURANCE

(Mr. WYATT (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WYATT. Mr. Speaker, in the last two decades the State of Oregon has had the unfortunate occasion to experience the wild ravages of the forces of nature several times. Most of these disasters were floods.

Just 3 years ago at Christmas a heavy snowfall followed by sudden warming created flood conditions so critical that certain parts of the State were named national disaster areas. This is why I have carefully studied possible areas of flood relief, and why I have introduced flood insurance legislation and have worked diligently for its passage.

Floods wreak terrible damage, and, although the toll in lives lost directly and through associated disease are bad, the damage to the property of uninsured individuals generally makes up far and away the greatest proportion of loss.

In flood-prone areas those persons who most need financial protection from the dangers of flooding are the least likely to have that protection. Either they are classified as absolutely uninsurable, or the rates are so exorbitant as to be prohibitive.

The National Flood Insurance Act of 1967, passed this past week by the House of Representatives, is a marked step toward providing some measure of financial security for those families finding themselves in flood-prone areas.

Admittedly, this measure is just a first step. But it is a long step and an impor-

tant one on the way to providing flood-threatened individuals with the protection and security they should and must have.

Together with our rapid advancement in the field of flood control through strategically located dams and water reservoirs, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1967 should be looked upon as another great stride forward in protecting the people of this Nation, both physically and financially from the crippling effects of natural disasters.

ABM

HOSMER STATEMENT IN ABM HEARINGS

(Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the

TABLE I

Yearly additional rate	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
200.....	540	740	940	1,140	1,340	1,540	1,740
300.....	640	940	1,240	1,540	1,840	-----	-----
400.....	740	1,140	1,540	1,940	-----	-----	-----

It makes little difference whether these additions are in ICBM configuration or take the form of orbiting weapons. In either event they will carry large hydrogen warheads and their purpose is the same.

The precise reason the Soviets maintain, improve and expand their strategic nuclear system is to be able to make a surprise attack which so severely damages us that our retaliatory forces are rendered incapable of hitting back with unacceptable destruction. The fact they continue to spend billions of rubles on this system makes it obvious they intend to use it when it can be employed successfully on its offensive mission.

The precise reason we maintain our strategic nuclear system is to deter such an attack. Deterrence is a defensive maneuver and its success depends on obviously being able to suffer such an attack and still have sufficient undamaged surviving weapons to impose unacceptable retaliatory destruction on the attacker's homeland.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara properly points out that the keystone of deterrence is a capability to "absorb any surprise nuclear attack and to retaliate with sufficient strength to destroy the attacking nation as a viable society." He believes this involves not so much the atomic punch of our warheads as it does laying them down with precision on their targets. He feels it depends not so much on the number of our missiles as it does their survivability. He contends survivability does not necessarily require ABMs to intercept enemy warheads, but that what is important is hardened ICBM sites capable of withstanding the explosions and functioning afterward.

He promises—and has convinced President Johnson—that enough of our strikeback strength will survive any conceivable attack to impose "assured destruction." As the Soviets come closer and closer to us in numerical parity, more and more of the validity of his promise turns whether they are using warheads sufficiently powerful to penetrate our hardened silos and destroy our ICBMs.

In announcing the Soviet orbital system last Friday Mr. McNamara again contended that Soviet yields are in the 1 to 3 megaton range—insufficient to penetrate our silos. He refuses to recognize the Soviet penchant for large yields in the 10 MT to 30 MT range, or the superior thrust of their rockets which enables them to carry the more power-

ful warheads—presumably capable of penetrating and destroying our ICBMs in their silos. Nor, have I ever heard him admit that even if he is right about Soviet yields at this moment, there is any guarantee that tomorrow their strategic nuclear system cannot or will not be retro-fitted with the larger warheads.

Secretary McNamara surely cannot speak about today's Soviet warheads with any more verity than his Joint Chiefs of Staff who apparently disagree with him on the issue. Nor can he speak with any more assurance about future Soviet warheads than even members of this Joint Committee and others privy to the same intelligence estimates that he is.

As the trend toward parity continues it becomes increasingly important to determine—as best we can—whether or not, utilizing the proper yield warheads, a Soviet surprise attack at numerical parity actually will leave us an undamaged "assured destruction" capability. For the purpose we must assume continued improvements in their guidance will bring accuracy to within around 2000 feet and it is reasonable to assume their force has been programmed against our 1054 landbased ICBMs, locations of which are known.

Under these circumstances the Rand Corporation's "Bomb Damage Effect Computer" calculates a 92% destruction probability—destruction of 970 of our 1054 land-based ICBMs, leaving 84 undamaged to retaliate.

It can be assumed our 25 Polaris submarines actually at sea with about 400 Polaris missiles will be subject to some attrition from a fairly large number of Soviet submarines and other attackers. To round out calculations generously we can assume 79%—316 Polaris missiles—will actually get away on retaliatory missions.

Our total retaliatory force will thus be 400 missiles with what generally are assumed to be 1 megaton warheads. If the Soviet ABM defense system is only 50% effective, 200 will get through to their targets.

Will that 200 impose "assured destruction"? The answer does not require revelation of national secrets. It can be done with substantial confidence using the laws of probability. We can assume that all 1454 of our missiles are targeted for destruction of the

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Soviet Union, because any lesser assumption simply decreases the retaliatory damage calculation about to be made. It also is logical to assume the 100% destruction mission will be divided proportionately between land-based and Polaris missiles according to their respective ratios in the stockpile, 72% and 28%, and that they will be destructive in the same relationship as the number reaching target is to the total available the moment before surprise attack—7.9% for landbased missiles and 39.5% for Polaris. Damage calculations are shown on table II.

TABLE II
[In percent]

	Planned damage	Missiles on target	Actual damage
Land based.....	72	7.9	5.7
Polaris.....	28	39.5	11.1
Total.....	100		16.8

Prior to World War II the USSR lost 10% to 15% of its population during the purges. During WWII it lost over 13% of its population. From the Soviet viewpoint it is questionable whether a 16.8% population loss from retaliation would be unacceptable and therefore constitute "assured destruction." In WWII the USSR suffered a total loss of 40% of its industrial capacity. By comparison it might regard a 16.8% loss to be a bargain-basement price for world domination.

I anticipate a quarrel with my figures by claims that our arsenal has a large "over-kill" capability and several missiles may be assigned to the same target, thus "assuring" destruction. It will be said there are about 150 city-industrial complexes in the USSR worth hitting, so that starts us with about 10 bombs in stockpile for each—and if 200 get through, that still allows 1½ per complex to assure destruction.

My answer is straightforward. In assuming that 200 missiles penetrated Soviet defenses, I assumed that all were assigned to the city-industrial complexes. Actually not less than 25% would likely be assigned to purely military targets. That leaves 150—one per complex. Further, it is unreasonable to assume that ICBMs are perfect and there would be no malfunctioning. It is more realistic to assume 5% loss for rocket power failures, another 5% for guidance system troubles, another 5% for warhead defects, then allow 5% more for post-attack human judgment degradation at our retaliatory command and control centers, and another 5% loss to account for Soviet civil defense. This totals another 25% and leaves only 100 missiles, ⅔ of a missile per complex. Since complexes actually should need about 4 warheads to accomplish the 100% destruction we assumed, that means the remaining warheads will account for but 25 complexes—whether by 25% destruction of 100 complexes, 100% destruction of 25 complexes, or some combination in between. Thus, since 25 complexes is 16.6% of the 150 complexes started with—destruction amounts only to .2% difference from the 16.8% figure arrived at by another route and the refutation of my calculations does not stand up.

I also anticipate an effort to attack my calculations by asserting they neglect MIRV. This is a "Multiple Individual Re-entry Vehicle" package attaching more than one warhead to a missile. But since the Russians are as smart technically as we are there is no validity to a contention that they are not also going to MIRV and thereby cancelling out whatever advantage we might otherwise anticipate. And, since they are blessed with rockets capable of carrying larger payloads than ours, there is no assurance they just might pack more warheads per delivery vehicle than us and again an advantage.

My conclusion is that we should (1) be adding to our numbers of ICBMs; (2) we should be putting in an ABM system against the Soviets, not just the Chinese; (3) we should not phase out the B-52s and B-58s, which I did not include in this discussion and which may well be the balance of power on our side at this moment making deterrence work; and, (4) we should be analyzing whether a second mission for the orbiting weapon is to knock out any antiballistic missile system we put in, and thereby clear the way for a rain of Soviet ICBMs to follow.

It is interesting to note that decisions affecting nuclear deterrence which a President makes on the advice of his Defense Secretary and others probably will not affect the strategic power of the nation during his term of office. But they may largely determine the degree of strategic superiority—or inferiority—available to his successor.

This is an ironic fact of life in the nuclear age. The decisions made by President Eisenhower gave President Kennedy the opportunity to build superior weapons systems. The decisions President Kennedy and President Johnson have made may determine whether their successors have the opportunity to build superior strategic systems to defend the nation. If they have made mistakes, their administrations will not suffer for it, but in the future the nation may be hard pressed to cope with nuclear blackmail or even a disastrous surprise attack.

ABM WHAT SECRETARY McNAMARA FAILED TO TELL ABOUT THE SOVIET ORBITING WEAPON

(Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, over 5 months ago many more details about the Soviet orbiting weapon were revealed than Secretary McNamara disclosed in his Friday press conference. These were contained in the May 29, 1967, issue of the American Security Council's Washington Report. The article was written by the exceptionally well-informed Dr. Steffan T. Possony, of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University. For the information of the Congress and of the public I have obtained unanimous consent for the republication of Possony's statement below.

It is to be noted that McNamara inexplicably designates the weapon as FOBS—fractional orbital missile system—while the Soviet call it by the code name Scrag, a word which the dictionary defines as meaning "to wring the neck off; also to garotte."

A most vital disclosure by Possony is that the Scrag warhead in orbital configuration would have a 30-megaton warhead, presumably sufficient to penetrate our hardened ICBM silos, ruin our ICBM missiles and thus destroy our retaliatory capacity. Despite Soviet capabilities with this size warhead and larger, and the ability of their rocket motors to hoist them, McNamara continues to insist that Scrag warhead yields are only in the 1- to 3-megaton range. I believe he does so less with assured knowledge of the yield than he does wishfully, to support his continued claims that we do not need an IBM system for protection be-

cause our missile silos are so strong they cannot be penetrated.

During McNamara's Friday press conference a hint was tossed out that, if anything, Scrag was designed to suppress our manned bombers by catching them on the ground with only a 3-minute attack warning. A more pertinent speculation might be that Scrag would be put not only to that mission but two more in the following sequence: First, to destroy the acquisition radar of any antiballistic-missile system we might install, that is, function as an anti-ABM weapon; and, second, to destroy our retaliatory ICBM's in their silos.

That Secretary McNamara has chosen not only to rename Scrag as FOBS and then depreciate its possible adverse effect on American security, while at one and the same time enunciate a legal brief for Soviet development of such a weapon is amazing and regrettable. Had we developed such a system and the Soviet Secretary of Defense announced it similarly he would have been put up against a wall and shot instantly.

Full details about Scrag disclosed by Possony and which Secretary McNamara withheld are as followed:

SCRAG: THE WEAPON OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

For several years now, American strategists have been debating the question of whether it would be useful to develop or deploy nuclear space weapons. Space weapons, notably bombs or radiation weapons, could be built but need not be orbited before the onset of a crisis; or they could be deployed in orbit to win cold or hot conflicts through space mastery, just as during the 19th century Britain was able to prevail through its dominion of the high seas.

The dominant Washington attitude has been that space weapons offer no advantages over conventional ICBM's. Some scientists have even argued that a space weapon is a "stupid weapon" because it is more expensive, less accurate, and less usable than the weapon which, according to their uncritical assumption, it replaces, namely the long-range missile. (This was the classical argument of the gun against the airplane and of the airplane against the missile. Incidentally, new weapons usually do not "replace" old weapons, but the new and the old arms join in novel combinations of mutually-supporting systems.)

As usual, when the American strategic community indulges in flights of fancy and tries to prove that a plausible weapon is neither feasible nor advisable, or in any event is too expensive, the Soviets just move forward and produce the weapon which our conformist chorus denigrates.

In the present instance, the Soviets did something which no one expected: they came up with a weapon which can be used as a normal ICBM or as a space bomb or, for good measure, as a fractional orbital weapon. This three-stage triple-in-one soviet weapon code-named "Scrag" was announced by Brezhnev on July 4, 1965 and first exhibited on November 7, 1965.

By the end of 1966, some characteristics of this remarkable instrument had become known. According to the best presently available information, Scrag, used as an ICBM, could carry a 50 MT warhead; in its orbital configuration, the warhead would have a yield of 30 MT. The yield of the sub-orbital assembly is unknown, but it may be estimated at about 40 MT. It is probable that with some reduction of overall yield, all Scrag configurations, including the orbital as-

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sembly, can be fitted for the delivery of multiple warheads. (The Soviets may not have full test-validated data on space configurations for the Scrag, hence, there could be some "bugs" yet in the weapon.)

In terms of firepower, one orbital Scrag is the equivalent of 20-30 of our Minutemen Missiles. One ICBM-Scrag equals more than five Titan II or 50 Minutemen. A major technological surprise, therefore, has been achieved by the Soviets, contrary to the often-voiced Pentagon conviction that significant surprises no longer are likely.

The information about this new threat became known at the very time when the United States was signing a treaty outlawing space weapons. The information was soft-pedalled, lest it disturb our greatest venture in space diplomacy. The widely acclaimed and rarely analyzed treaty was sent to the Senate. Ratification was achieved by unanimous vote. Yet, the treaty provides no defense whatever against Scrag or other space weapons. On the contrary, it inhibits the U.S. from protecting itself against space attack.

The American press did not pick up this sensational counterpoint story. Hence, the American public never heard of Scrag and if asked, might well confuse it with a new beach resort in Hawaii. It is even more disturbing that the present civilian "high command" of the Pentagon does not think Scrag is very important and needs to be neutralized by an ABM system adjusted to handle both orbital and missile warheads.

What are the additional capabilities which Scrag gives to the Soviet Union?

1. Though it is not too difficult to extend the range of missiles, each ICBM is essentially targeted against a few locations. By contrast, Scrag provides the Soviets with a genuine capability to hit every spot on earth, at very short notice.

2. In terms of target selection, missiles do not have the operational flexibility of a combined orbital, sub-orbital or ballistic system.

3. The presumed capability of Scrag to be fitted with single and multiple warheads renders this weapon effective against a whole spectrum of targets, ranging from strongly hardened pinpoint targets like missile and nuclear storage sites, to soft large targets like metropolitan clusters, and to numerous smaller and semi-hardened targets within a large area like industrial installations and airfields.

4. Soviet military thinking has been impressed by the idea that a major offensive should be run in three successive "waves" or blows. If the three different configurations of Scrag are fired simultaneously, the ICBM would hit after half-an-hour and the sub-orbital version after one-hour-and-a-half. The orbital bombs could be used for subsequent salvo, serial or individual attacks, at the discretion of the Soviet high command.

5. The orbital bombs also would be available as a strategic reserve, for days, weeks or months. Thus, they would provide the Soviets with an option to fight a short or a long nuclear war. If the U.S. has no defenses against the space threat and if it does not pursue an effective counter-force strategy, Scrag would be invulnerable while on the ground, in space, and on its target run. If so, the orbital bombs would be available after the so-called nuclear exchange in which the U.S. would have expended its nuclear weapons. In this case, these bombs would embody a war-winning nuclear monopoly.

6. The orbital weapons could be directed at targets that escaped destruction during the initial blow or at targets that were spared for the ultimate phase of the conflict. The weapons could be used to compel surrender, or else to punish the resister by destroying one city after the other. After surrender the space weapons would facilitate occupation, allowing the Communists to takeover, control or devastate the vanquished country.

7. Through simultaneous launch, the missiles and the sub-orbital configurations could be used to destroy American strategic power, whereas the orbital bombs would terminate and win the war. In a staggered-firing series, the Soviets could launch the orbital Scrag hours or days before the rest of their force is released. Whenever the Soviets estimate that a credible and overwhelming nuclear threat is enough to force us to our knees, they may be satisfied just to orbit the space bombs and rely on purely psychological effectiveness. But if a physical nuclear attack should become necessary, pre-launched Scrag could be used to negate existing warning systems and to execute very rapid pre-emptive counter-force strikes against the United States.

8. The sub-orbital and orbital Scrag provide the Soviets with a significant capability of detonating high-yield explosions at very high altitudes and through a drawn-out firing series to keep U.S. electronics and communications inoperable. With such a capability, they would be able to "pin down" our strike forces. Under certain circumstances and given certain assumptions, Scrag could be used for sustaining high-altitude X-ray screens, thus delaying or precluding retaliation. (High-altitude explosions could blind many millions of people. High-yield bombs launched from space would allow genocidal strategies.)

9. The new Scrag capability, notably the sub-orbital version, allows the Soviets to intervene with increasing effectiveness into local crises and to threaten any country that may take an anti-communist position. Further, the information on Scrag is still another item in our current intelligence regarding Soviet weapons that indicates the strategic balance in changing. This change—in the Soviets' favor—is one reason why the U.S.S.R. has not hesitated to intensify the Cold War.

10. Except perhaps for SLM systems, Scrag represents the first genuine global weapon in history. Once the U.S. has been neutralized or destroyed and provided a sufficient number of orbital warheads is left over, Scrag could force each heretofore free country to establish a Communist government and would ensure that this government remains obedient to Moscow. Scrag, therefore, is the optimal weapon for the completion of the world revolution and for the preservation of Communist world rule.

11. If the U.S.S.R. elects to orbit Scrag space bombs without a concomitant missile strike, the U.S., depending upon the magnitude of the unexpected Soviet space deployment, might suddenly find itself in a posture of accentuated military inferiority. (For example, 50 Scrag may position 250 to 500 additional warheads.) Given present U.S. capabilities, the Scrag could not be shot down; if we intercepted some of them, the Soviets might elect to regard such action as U.S. aggression. If upon a sudden Soviet space deployment, we attack the U.S.S.R. forthwith, regardless of whether we still have the strength to win, we could invite our own physical destruction. If we did not attack, the Soviets could destroy us politically. Thereupon, the orbital bombs could blackmail one country after the other. Ultimately, and entirely in accordance with the Kremlin's preference, the world revolution would be completed by "peaceful means."

Thus, Scrag will increase the effectiveness of nuclear psychological warfare, enhance the effectiveness of Soviet physical nuclear strategy; possibly deter or prevent counter-strikes and retaliation; conceivably maneuver the U.S. into self-destruction or surrender, as well as facilitate and perhaps bring about world conquest.

The Soviets are deploying Scrag simultaneously with their ABM weapons. The resulting strategic imbalance is dangerously aggravated by these other gaps in our own capabilities: Our erstwhile numerical supe-

riority may be giving way to quantitative inferiority. Our Minutemen missiles allow only a very narrow target selection and are not capable of taking out strongly hardened or large area targets. We do not have up-to-date weapon systems for multiple or serial strikes, nor can we preserve portions of our main strikes forces as a strategic reserve. We are not prepared to fight a long war; once our bombers are completely obsolete, attrited, de-activated or destroyed in battle, we will lack a strategic system suited for winning the terminal phases of war. We also lack offensive and defensive space weapons. And we refuse to build defenses against missiles, and to protect three-quarters of our population against the hazards of nuclear war.

In summary: The United States is confronted by an entirely new and dramatically augmented threat. The ominous development of Scrag was not predicted by U.S. intelligence nor by U.S. computers, let alone by Messrs. McNamara and Brown. Since our country continues to see no evil and hear no evil, time is beginning to run very short. It just may be that we are too gullible too bemused, and too disinterested to survive.

STEFAN T. POSSONY,

Strategy and Military Affairs, Editor.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, during part of this afternoon I was in attendance at the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's hearings on ABM defenses. These hearings were held in the New Senate Office Building, and it was impossible to interrupt my attendance at the hearings for all the frequently called votes in the House.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

(Mr. DENNEY (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DENNEY. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill, the purpose of which is to provide the necessary machinery to prevent the needless destruction of one of our Nation's basic industries, the textile industry.

The impact of excessive cheap foreign imports has especially been felt by our domestic wool industry. This industry has experienced a severe depression since July of 1966 which continues unabated resulting in shorter work hours and adding to unemployment. There are over 300,000 woolgrowers in the United States and thousands of people in connected-service industries who are dependent upon them.

Mr. Speaker, the need for immediate action is apparent. For instance, imports of woven wool cloth, chief product of the wool textile industry in 1966 were 64 percent over those in 1961. In 1966 alone, cloth imports displaced about 20 million manhours of work in U.S. mills. Even my colleagues who would generally support the administration's viewpoint, must agree that this is not in keeping with the President's plea to create new jobs for our disadvantaged.

The source of imports of wool manufacturers has shifted rapidly to Japan

and other oriental countries with low wage scales. For instance in 1966, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan accounted for about two-thirds of the imports of woven wool cloth. I find this fact especially disturbing in the case of Japan. As my colleagues know, this country has expended great amounts of money and effort in placing that country on its feet after World War II. However, now that Japan has recovered, although it seems willing to sell goods to this country, it has high protective barriers directed against American imports. Not only does it restrict imports, but economic policies are such that it denies substantial American equity investment in their domestic industries.

Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we are still facing an increasing balance-of-payments problem. Excessive foreign imports contribute substantially to this deficit. In wool textiles and apparel alone, in 1961 imports exceeded exports by \$144 million. In 1966 this deficit soared to \$310 million. The figures become even greater when other segments of the textile industry are added.

Mr. Speaker, the distinguished chairman of our Ways and Means Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. Mills], has already introduced similar legislation. It would be my hope that this entire problem could be explored in depth with the benefit of early hearings on the subject.

A copy of my bill follows:

H.R. _____

A bill to provide for orderly trade in textile articles

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Textile Trade Act of 1967".

SEC. 2. The Congress finds that the program for orderly trade in textile articles instituted by the President in 1961 has not been fully implemented. Imports of textile articles have grown two and one-half times since that year, with particular concentration and disruption in certain areas. Such imports contribute to reduced employment opportunities for United States workers in the domestic textile industry. International agreements already exist for orderly trade in cotton textiles and numerous agreements between countries other than the United States exist for trade in textile articles of other fibers as well as cotton.

It is, therefore, declared to be the policy of Congress that access to the United States market for foreign produced textile articles should be on an equitable and orderly basis consistent with the maintenance of a strong and expanding United States textile industry and designed to avoid the disruption of United States markets and the unemployment of United States textile workers.

SEC. 3. The President is authorized and directed to undertake negotiations with other Governments for the purpose of consummating agreements to provide orderly trade in textile articles, including the quantitative limitation of imports of all such articles into the United States. Such agreements and the authority contained in section 4 shall limit the annual importation of each category of textile articles to the share of the United States consumption of such category supplied by imported textile articles during a representative historical period of not less than one calendar year prior to the year 1967, as determined by the President. Such representative historical period shall be the same for all countries and all categories of textile

articles. The President shall have full authority to determine the share of total imports of any category of textile articles which may be supplied by any country to the United States on the basis of historical patterns of such imports, the interests of developing countries, and such other factors affecting trade in such categories as he deems appropriate.

SEC. 4. To effectuate the purposes of section 3, when agreements exist which cover a significant portion of the United States imports of textile articles, the President shall by proclamation limit the quantity of such articles designated by categories which may be imported from any country or countries not parties to such agreements.

SEC. 5. After one hundred and eighty days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the total quantity of imports of each category of textile articles not subject to an agreement or agreements negotiated pursuant to section 3 or to proclamations issued under section 4 shall be limited during any calendar year to the average annual quantity of such articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the six calendar years 1961-1966. The total quantities of any textile article which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the balance of the calendar year in which this section becomes effective shall be equal to that proportionate share of the average annual imports of such article for the years 1961-1966 which the number of days remaining in the calendar year bears to three hundred and sixty-five. Beginning with the calendar year following the year in which this section becomes effective the total quantity of any category of textile articles which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in that year and each succeeding calendar year shall be increased or decreased by an amount corresponding to the increase or decrease (if more than 5 per centum) in the United States consumption of such category during the preceding calendar year compared with the year previous thereto, except that the amount of such increase in any category of textile article which may be entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during any calendar years shall not exceed 10 per centum of the amount of such increase in United States consumption of such category.

SEC. 6. Nothing contained in this Act shall affect in any way quantitative import limitations established pursuant to international agreements, either multilateral or bilateral, which were in effect on July 1, 1967, so long as such agreements remain in force and effect and are enforced by the United States in a manner which controls imports to the minimum amounts permitted under such agreements.

SEC. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "textile articles" includes top, yarn, fabric, apparel, man-made staple fiber, filaments, and filament yarns, and all other textile manufactures, whether spun, woven, knit, felted, bonded, or otherwise manufactured of cotton, wool, or man-made fiber, or any combination or blend thereof or in combination with other fibers.

(b) The term "category" means a type or class of textile articles such as staple, yarn, fabric, apparel, made up goods, or other article, whether based on count, construction, style, weight, value, or other characteristics.

(c) The term "textile industry" includes all establishments engaged in the production of textile articles.

SEC. 8. The President may issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

FARMERS COME TO DEMONSTRATE

(Mr. ZWACH (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the

RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ZWACH. Mr. Speaker, quite recently there was a peace demonstration here in Washington by—what the Defense Department estimated to be—35,000 people. When the demonstration was over some 400 demonstrators had been jailed and the taxpayers had a million dollar bill to pay for extra police and cleanup operations.

By contrast, on August 16, 35,400 farm folk gathered at Des Moines, Iowa, under the auspices of the National Farmers Organization. It was a moving demonstration, a demonstration very different from other demonstrations which have occurred in the United States during recent years.

Mr. Speaker, in order to share with my colleagues the contrast between this farm demonstration and other demonstrations held in our country, I would like to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point an article by Msgr. Edward W. O'Rourke, which appeared in the St. Cloud Visitor of November 3, 1967:

NFO MEETS: 35,400 FARMERS COME TO DEMONSTRATE

(By Msgr. Edward W. O'Rourke)

On Aug. 16, 35,400 farm folk gathered at Des Moines under the auspices of the National Farmers Organization. This was the largest meeting of farmers which has ever taken place. But, it was more—it was a moving demonstration, a demonstration very different from other demonstrations which have occurred in the United States during recent years.

Most demonstrations are organized as protests—against the war in Vietnam, against racial discrimination, unfair labor practices, etc. Those who gathered at Des Moines on Aug. 16 came to protest unfair farm prices. But they had a more positive purpose, too. They came to pledge cooperation in a nationwide effort to bargain for better prices.

Many demonstrations are unruly and loud. 35,400 farm folk came and went from Des Moines in perfect order, without a single unpleasant incident.

Many demonstrators are unkempt, unclean and freakish in their appearance and conduct. The men and women who came to Des Moines on August 16 were clean-shaven, neatly dressed and well mannered.

Most demonstrations are noisy and brief shows by a very small group. The NFO demonstration in Des Moines was a massive meeting which lasted 6 hours. Many of the participants had ridden buses for 10 to 14 hours en route to Des Moines; they sat in a sweltering auditorium for 6 hours and then boarded their buses for the long ride home.

The 35,400 farm folk who came to Des Moines on Aug. 16 had something to say. Everything about them and their meeting indicates that they deserve a hearing.

This is what I heard these folks say on Aug. 16: We consider farming a way of life and intend to preserve the family farm system. We want prices which will pay the cost of production and a fair profit. We are convinced that the Government cannot or will not give us such prices; we intend to bargain together to obtain them. If necessary, we shall resort to a massive holding action of all major farm commodities as a means to bargain for fair prices.

I am convinced that these 35,400 persons deserve a hearing. First and foremost, the farmers of our nation should listen to them. Either they should join in the bargaining effort planned or come forward immediately with a better plan. To procrastinate or to do nothing is completely unreasonable.

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All members of the NFO should listen. A massive holding action will succeed only if a very large number of farmers hold their products. Members of the NFO must either convince their neighbors to join the NFO or in some legitimate way to support the proposed bargaining effort.

Leaders of other farm organizations should listen. It must be apparent to all openminded observers that a rapidly growing and very large number of farmers want to bargain for fair prices. Any farm organization which fails to meet this need will probably lose members.

Officials in Washington should listen. They have done little to serve the needs of the folk who met in Des Moines on Aug. 16. These are hard-working, loyal U.S. citizens. They deserve more understanding and better service from their government.

American consumers should listen. Farmers deserve better prices. Consumers must be willing to pay accordingly.

I pray that the great demonstration in Des Moines on Aug. 16 will lead to an accomplishment of the just cause which 35,400 good people proposed that day.

SALUTE TO THE GRANGE

(Mr. ZWACH (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ZWACH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call attention to the fact that the oldest farm organization in the United States—the National Grange—celebrates its 100th anniversary this year.

This centennial event will be celebrated during their weeklong national convention at Syracuse, N.Y., November 13 to 22.

Oliver Hudson Kelley, the father of the Grange, settled on a homestead near Elk River, Minn. Mr. Kelley helped to organize the first State Grange in Minnesota in 1869.

As we pay tribute to the oldest farm organization in America, a short recap of its 100 years finds its history started with national and local accomplishments in behalf of rural America. A partial listing shows the Grange was active in the educational and legislative process of securing passage of the Farmers Home Administration; the rural electrification program; Public Law 83-480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act; the parcel post system and rural free delivery; the Interstate Highway System; and many other long-lasting programs of benefit to society.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud that this organization, which has served our Nation so well, had its roots in the Sixth Congressional District of Minnesota. My sincere congratulations to the National Grange on the occasion of attaining 100 years of age, and best wishes for continued service to mankind in the next century of growth.

CONGRESSMAN HORTON CRITICIZES PROPOSAL TO SHIFT CERTAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION TO THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

(Mr. HORTON (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the

Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, it is my firm belief that it is a serious mistake to scatter Federal services for small businesses among several agencies. In 1953 Congress created an independent agency to deal exclusively with the problems of small business. I only wish that every act we passed produced results as constructive as those which have flowed from the creation of the Small Business Administration.

Surely one of the reasons the economy has done so well through the last 7 years lies in the impressive gains small business made. It is clear from the record that SBA has been a strong factor in these gains.

In just the last 4 years, SBA has made nearly 43,000 general business loans, contributing some \$1.7 billion in new investment to the economy. These loans have opened hundreds of thousands of new jobs, directly and indirectly.

The small business population has climbed sharply, to a total that now exceeds 5 million firms. Four years ago, it was roughly 4.7 million. Thus, the small business community is growing by a net gain of 70,000 to 100,000 new firms a year.

Now we find that in section 406 of title IV of the poverty bill, provision is made to transfer vital SBA functions to the Department of Commerce. If these provisions are not removed or amended by the House, they certainly would go a long way toward undoing much good which has been accomplished during the past 14 years by SBA, operating as a one-stop shop center for small business.

The program we are on the verge of giving to Commerce and the Office of Economic Opportunity could surely be better handled by SBA, which already has the basic responsibility in this area and has a wealth of experience that Commerce and OEO simply do not share. These changes will merely lead to duplication and confusion.

In order to carry out the provisions now embodied in section 406 of title IV, it would be necessary to establish another miniature Small Business Administration within the Department of Commerce. Has anyone stopped to consider the cost of such an endeavor? How much time and money would it take to effectively change the orientation of the Department of Commerce so that it might meet the needs of small business?

Perhaps the seriousness of the situation can best be described by showing what could happen to SBA's vital procurement function if section 406 remains as is. The proposal would create duplicating and overlapping programs in the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Commerce Department's Economic Development Administration.

The SBA—within the limits of its budget—is doing just the sort of work some observers want to see turned over to OEO and Commerce. SBA already has an Office of Procurement Assistance and administers a number of programs specifically designed to funnel business into distressed locales. Both OEO and EDA, under the proposed ground rules, will

have the authority and money with which to outbid each other for furtherance of their own pet projects. SBA has no authority to offer financial "rewards" to firms that cooperate with it.

In short, section 406 undercuts the work now being performed by SBA and allows OEO and EDA to "bribe prime and subcontractors away from programs SBA has developed out of 15 years of experience.

Legislation already on the books in the Small Business Act could be used to do the very things that are called for in the proposed legislation—instead of that, the proposal would nullify efforts of SBA which currently is giving priority to programs aimed at assisting ghetto areas.

At the time SBA was established by Congress, section 12 of the enabling act provided that all the functions, duties, and powers of any then existing Government departments bearing on small business should be transferred to SBA—including records, property, and necessary personnel. The proposals now before the House Education and Labor Committee would reverse this precedent. The new groups are quite apt to be working at cross purposes with the existing agency which has proven its competence over the past 14 years.

In the name of helping small business, let us not take steps that may easily turn out to injure it. Let us amend section 406 so as to substitute "Small Business Administrator" for "Secretary of Commerce" wherever the latter appears in that section.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be able to say that I am joined in my opposition to this provision of the poverty bill by all of my colleagues on the Small Business Committee and by the distinguished chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, Hon. CARL PERKINS. Chairman PERKINS wrote to me and the other members of the Small Business Committee who had earlier written to him expressing our concern for this provision. He assured all of us that he joins us in feeling that the term "Small Business Administrator" should be substituted for "Secretary of Commerce" wherever it appears in section 406 of title IV of the poverty bill.

I am hopeful that the House will act to preserve the integrity of this vital Federal agency.

HUNT-WESSON CANCELS SOVIET OIL IMPORTS

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the Hunt-Wesson Co., of Fullerton, Calif., has canceled purchases of Soviet vegetable oil and has informed me that a 20-million-pound shipment originally expected to dock last weekend at New Orleans is no longer en route to U.S. port. The announcement was good news for American farmers, especially those with sons in Vietnam.

While I am gratified at the company's belated decision, I am determined, none-

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theless, to make sure that none of the 13 million pounds of Soviet oil the firm has already accepted in this country is fed to U.S. servicemen in Vietnam.

It would be a gargantuan irony if U.S. soldiers in Vietnam wounded by Soviet weapons, were fed Soviet vegetable oil purchased, in effect, by U.S. taxpayers. Hunt-Wesson is one of the largest suppliers of vegetable oil to U.S. forces in Vietnam and has declared that none of the supplies are from the Soviet Union. The Defense Department has assured me an investigation. I have demanded firsthand verification that none of the Soviet oil is commingled in preparation of orders for Vietnam.

Text of telegram received November 4:

HON. PAUL FINDLEY: No Soviet oil has been used by Hunt-Wesson in fulfilling Department of Defense contracts. Ship Prometheus no longer enroute to U.S. port. Shipment of cottonseed oil on Prometheus was rejected October 26 on receipt of laboratory test results showing oil failed to meet standards required by purchase contract. We have no plans for making additional Soviet oil purchases.

R. B. GABLER,
Vice President.

ABM

McNAMARA'S "THIN" ABM COULD TRIGGER NATO COLLAPSE

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the House Republican Committee on Western Alliances today warned that the McNamara "thin" ABM system could rupture NATO.

The committee's conclusions and recommendations are contained in a statement published today. Here is the text:

McNAMARA'S "THIN" ABM COULD TRIGGER NATO COLLAPSE

The Administration's decision last month to begin the deployment of a "thin" anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense carries with it the stark possibility of fatally rupturing our North Atlantic military alliance.

Secretary McNamara strove to justify the decision claiming the ABM system would act as a deterrent to Red Chinese nuclear blackmail sometime in the 1970's, but he was forced to admit the system would have value in protecting our launch sites from a Soviet ICBM attack. It is significant that over the past year Congressional pressures and the recommendations of our chief military advisors were to deploy an ABM mainly in response to the Soviet Union's ABM system. Initial European reaction has been to view our ABM deployment as more Cold War competition. Secretary McNamara himself has repeatedly pointed out that a "thin" system would provide the momentum for expansion that could trigger a new arms race.

Just as the development of purely national nuclear ballistic missiles in the late fifties created divisive policy problems within NATO, so will the development of purely defensive nuclear weapons heighten these differences. In addition, the deployment of ABM systems by the United States and the Soviet Union will radically widen the gap between the two super super-powers and the rest of the nations of the world.

Unless timely policies are undertaken at once to forestall it, our European allies will ultimately be driven to positions of defensive neutrality, and a long-standing goal of Soviet foreign policy will have been realized:

the break-up of NATO into a fragmented set of middle-sized states, each of which would be highly vulnerable to Soviet power squeezes.

To prevent this calamity, the United States must—without further delay—explore fully with her NATO allies the possibilities of developing a NATO ABM system. As the nation possessing the preponderance of nuclear technology in the alliance, the U.S. should seek to share with its allies the development of an ABM defense serving the entire community on the basis of cooperative funding and construction. Of direct benefit to the defense United States would be advance warning from European-sited radars of a Soviet launch that would enable us to attempt offshore interceptions.

Although the NATO Nuclear Planning Council is reported to have discussed the need for ABM defense of western Europe, there is no evidence that the basic concept has been considered by the North Atlantic Council. If it has been so considered and rejected, surely the U.S. decision to "go-it-alone" was of sufficient importance to warrant announcement by President Johnson—with suitable reference to the attitude of our allies.

It is already apparent that the manner of Secretary of Defense McNamara's ABM announcement last month resulted in a gaffe comparable to his imperious scrapping of U.S. participation in the Skybolt Project back in 1962 that rocked the MacMillan government.

Prominent foreign policy analysts have reported that our allies grumbled that they were merely "informed"—not "consulted" about the ABM decision—with but advance copies of the Secretary's speech, exactly the same as sent to the Russians.

The decision to proceed with an ABM system—which has been unfolding in Congress and in the press this past year—was certainly momentous enough to have warranted full coordination with our allies and use of the full prestige of the President's office to explain it to the American public and our NATO allies.

Relegating the task to Secretary McNamara as the subject of a speech before a press services gathering of editors and publishers in San Francisco revealed anew the major foreign policy flaw of the Johnson Administration: the cavalier subordination of Western solidarity to the pursuit of detente with the Communist world. The Secretary's speech was drafted as one long assurance to the Soviet Union that we intend it no harm, and a continuation of his plea for a non-proliferation treaty unpopular with many of our European allies.

Since about five years will be required to deploy a "thin" ABM system within the United States, it is not too late to begin genuine consultative discussions with our allies towards the possibility of a community defense system. From studies already made there are several modes for deploying an ABM in Europe, all of which should be explored with our alliance partners.

We should not approach such a conference with a pre-announced "American package," such as the ill-fated multilateral force proposal, which Secretary McNamara tried to impose on NATO several years ago, but rather be prepared to listen as well as talk.

In the long run we must share more responsibilities so that western unity in international politics may be strengthened. It is neither necessary nor desirable that the U.S. counter the Soviet missile threat alone. Our unwillingness to share nuclear responsibility with our allies in the past has led to the present rift in NATO. We should not seal NATO's demise by rushing into the development of an ABM system alone.

Anti-missile defenses can either be a stumbling stone or a stepping stone toward west-

ern solidarity. The first step upward is one that the U.S. alone may take.

IS NATO CLOSING RANKS?

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. VANDER JAGT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the eminent foreign correspondent and columnist, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, recently congratulated the nations of NATO for closing ranks. I hope the congratulations are not premature. Certainly forward steps to stitch together this most essential of our free-world alliances is long overdue and the alliance must be more than restored to its former position of solidarity in military defensive matters. In order to survive the critical 1969 milestone it must take on useful new form, reaching into political, economic, and monetary matters as well as military. It must also be a focal point at which external policy decisions can be hammered out.

Here is Mr. Mowrer's perceptive and hopeful comment:

NATO CLOSING RANKS—BENEFITS COULD EXTEND TO MANY FIELDS

(By Edgar Ansel Mowrer)

Better late than never!

At long last, but still in good time, representatives of 14 of the 15 NATO countries have decided to close ranks, formulate common policies on crises in all parts of the world and compel potential adversaries everywhere to deal with what can be the strongest political and military unit in the world.

Provided of course that the NATO powers agree to place such responsibility in a fortified executive council.

What a relief to those of us who have, since NATO's foundation, urged the U.S. Administration to take the lead in making it a center of political, military, scientific and economic power able to cow and deter any conceivable adversary.

Yet we should go easy. The new plan is still only a proposal and will be put in final form by a special policy making group (the American member is Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow) at the end of this month. It will still have to be accepted by the fourteen countries, with or without the participation of France.

Moreover, this draft does not go nearly far enough. The individual governments are asked to "coordinate traffic in science and technology" rather than to pool their research and finding in these fields.

ARMS CONTROL ONE OBJECTIVE

It blinds them to seek common effective methods of "arms control" instead of military preponderance.

It recommends economic aid to developing (meaning underdeveloped) countries on a multilateral basis but apparently contains no mention of a common trade and economic policy toward common enemies.

Like the United States since the advent of the Kennedys, the drafters of the new blue print do not admit that they have enemies.

They talk of improving relations with the communist countries of Eastern Europe instead of making friendship with these countries dependent upon their dissolution of communist schools for subversion and upon the cessation of "little wars of liberation" and of communist promotion of third-party aggression such as the Arabs' recent attack on Israel.